

DD/A Registry

83-4344

EXCOM 83-011

23 September 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Committee Members
FROM: Executive Assistant to the Executive Director
SUBJECT: Agenda for the 13 October 1983 Executive
Committee Meeting: The Future of Economic
Intelligence

An Executive Committee Meeting to review the future of economic intelligence is scheduled for Thursday, 13 October, at 1000-1100 hours in the DCI Conference Room. Attached for your review is a paper prepared by the DDI.

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Attachment:
As stated

cc: Inspector General
Chief, Planning Staff

DOWNGRADED TO CONFIDENTIAL WHEN
ATTACHMENT REMOVED

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83-4376

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Executive Director

FROM: Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: The Future of Economic Intelligence

1. Following up on our conversation in July, I asked for a think piece on economic intelligence--where we are and the challenges we are likely to face in the years ahead. This paper is the result.

2. I believe this report raises a number of critical questions that we need to address. It is clear that economic intelligence is a vital part of the CIA's job and that the economic threats this nation will face directly and indirectly in the future will only grow in scope and complexity.

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SUBJECT: The Future of the United States

5. The attached is intended to get people started thinking and planning. It is only a first step. If you think it has merit, perhaps the two of you, the Executive Director, and the four deputies should meet to discuss it (or perhaps you three, Stein, and I to start).

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Robert M. Gates

Attachments:

Tab A. Economic Intelligence in the Years Ahead
Tab B. DCI Memo

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Economic Intelligence in the Years AheadIntroduction

Economic analysis in the Directorate of Intelligence and its collection needs have both changed and increased markedly over time. In the early years

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Since the mid-1970s a number of events and developments have served to intensify and once again change the nature of economic intelligence. The Arab oil embargo and subsequent sharp rises in oil prices brought home the vulnerability of US and other economies to their dependence on imports of strategic commodities. The ensuing recession and governments' attempts to overcome it underscored the growing linkages among economies around the world. One result was the start in 1974 of what have become annual Economic Summits, as leaders of the major industrial nations realized the importance of economic issues in their dealings with each other and with the Third World and the Communist Bloc.

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Most recently, the LDC debt problem has begun to threaten the political stability of strategically placed LDCs and to strain the fabric of the international financial system. Thus, today our intelligence effort has

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expanded to encompass both the economic issues as well as the strategic concerns that flow from them.

The Current Effort and Its Policy Connection

Our efforts to analytically tackle the challenges posed by these events were not haphazard. We have consistently taken into account where we can, and indeed should, make a unique contribution in supporting the formulation of US national policy.

The Agency's economic effort centers on issues affecting US strategic and economic relations with other nations. Our analysis is designed to meet policymakers' needs for objective, all-source assessments of foreign events that affect US interests.

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of water resources and Western dependency of strategic materials we
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analyze not only the impact of Western trade decisions but also to
understand what lies behind Soviet negotiation tactics. Our effort
also helps us assess pressures on foreign regimes -- our analysis of
Iran's agricultural sector is a case in point.

- o Our East-West economic effort emphasizes not only the scope of Western dependence and the policy intentions of our allies but also Moscow's leverage and vulnerability in trade and financial areas.

Obviously not all of our work is purely strategic in nature. Much of it represents the building block effort needed to firmly underpin critical analysis.

The Agency has a number of advantages in doing these kinds of analysis.

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Finally, our multidisciplinary structure allows us to weave the economic, political, and strategic threads of an issue into a coherent whole. This means we can give policymakers a richer picture than can be provided by the more narrowly focused work of other agencies who are often pushing their own specific policy interests.

In carrying out our analytical effort we factor in what others are doing around town -- mainly at State, Treasury, Commerce, USDA, and the Department of Energy. In general their efforts in all of these areas concentrate more on direct tactical support in implementing policy. To avoid needless duplication and to keep our effort on an intelligence track we work closely at all levels with the other agencies. In addition to regular informal contacts we participate in a broad range of interdepartmental group meetings. This helps us keep tabs on policy issues as they develop. We also support many special working groups such as the McNamara group studying the implications of lower

oil prices, the USDA's group on mineral stockpile programs. In such groups we provide the twist one would expect from the Intelligence Community.

It is through such formal and informal contacts that we are able to focus more directly on the specific areas where intelligence analysis is critical in shedding light on a given issue. Indeed, our formal research plan shows the impact that such contacts have on our analytical planning. It is only by maintaining a close dialogue that we can ensure that our efforts fulfill the responsibility of the Intelligence Community rather than simply replicate what others can and should be doing.

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issue.

Challenges Ahead

As we look at the decade ahead, our attention will remain on many of the topics we are already following, but also will turn to new ones. Clearly, Soviet linkages will remain important. Elsewhere, there will be an increasing number of issues that will affect national security. Simply exploring current trends points to the dimensions of some of the topics we will likely have to cope with.

- o A fair amount of our work will probably focus on the spillout from the debt crisis. While we believe a financial collapse can be avoided, it's hard to tell how the political and strategic dynamics surrounding the debt crisis will play themselves out.

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political disruptions occur in countries that are strategically important, the ramifications could be quite significant. Surely the impact the Latin American debt problem is already having only underscores this concern. The economic difficulties Mexico faces from its debt crisis already have the potential to alter the economic and political dynamics of a volatile Central America.

- o The impact of high technology is only now beginning to be felt. This revolution -- which has the potential to make the impact of the internal combustion engine pale in comparison -- will have profound security effects that we will have to explore.

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- o Advances in microprocessing, robotics, genetic engineering, and the like will not be limited to futuristic products and industries. The changes now taking place could completely alter the nature of even basic industries, such as steel. Advances in automation will eliminate the advantage that low-cost countries now have in these areas. Not even domestic service industries will be immune. The impact that something as simple as VCRs are already having on the movie business is but a single example. These shifts will add yet another strain to the fabric of society and to the international economic community.
- o The potential impact on basic industries will clearly affect the Third World. It could easily leave the LDCs with an antiquated economic structure. How will the critical elements of society respond to such an obvious failing of centralized government development planning? What will the impact be when countries discover that the linchpins of their development strategy -- such as steel plants -- are outmoded? Will the risks of more Iran's increase as power groups in developing nations reassess the track their societies must take? What openings would a move away from the Western model of development create for the Soviets?

The highly integrated nature of the world economy, coupled with these trends, could set into motion forces this country is currently unprepared for. If Western nations begin to protect the new growth industries of the 1980s and 1990s -- both in goods and services -- trade linkages could transmit increasing international discord. Orderly market arrangements, quotas, increased government involvement in trade, and the like could lead many smaller nations to turn inward both economically and politically. When the aftermath of the debt crisis is overlaid on this, the potential for shattering

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the current political makeup of the Free World only increases. Regional

groups, such as ASEAN and the Andean Group could well become vehicles for disruption rather than advancement. The impact and speed with which one nation's problems can be transmitted to others should not be underestimated.

As our understanding of insurgency, instability and narcotics trafficking grows and as the economic interconnections are explored, the demands for multidisciplinary analysis in these areas will increase. All the current trends point to a more tension-filled world. As nations adjust to the debt crisis, the high-technology revolution, and the like, prospects for instability and insurgency will only grow. Untangling the way these threads are woven together and indeed reinforce each other will tax us further.

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Initial Discussion and Preparation
for
DDI Records Declassification

29 July 1977

Meeting With DDI Office FPOs to Discuss Proposed Guidelines: I called a meeting of all named Office Focal Point Officers of the DDI to discuss my proposed guidelines. At a previous meeting I had asked them to write individual office guidelines and said that I would then pull them all together. There was an almost total lack of response to this request, with some statements that they did not know where to begin. As a result, I wrote the basic guideline and made the following observations at the meeting.

1. The guidelines were compiled from EO 11652, the NSC implementing directive of 1 June 1972, those guidelines of other offices already submitted and approved, and a few not seen elsewhere.

2. All of the guidelines may not be pertinent to all offices of the DDI. Indeed, some may not even be pertinent to the DDI, although this is unlikely. Let's view them as a starting point, something to build upon.

3. Bear in mind that the guidelines will probably never be set in concrete. They should be viewed as living documents, subject to revision at any time as dictated by experience with records declassification, the particular time frame in which the reviewers are functioning, changes in component missions, or as the political realities of the day may dictate.

4. Indeed, they may be amended when the new EO on the subject, now being written, is issued.

5. Probably the greatest change that will result from the new EO is that the mandatory record review period may be changed from 30 to 20 years. I leave to your imagination the impact this will have on what is now a monumental task.

6. We are trying this particular format in the hope that it will be more useable to reviewers, rather than burying several topics in a narrative style paragraph.

7. We are asking that you review what has been given to you and that you do the following:

a. Recommend deletions where you deem something not pertinent to your office's records or activities.

b. Recommend additions that you deem necessary.

c. To these guidelines, most of which will probably pertain to all offices, add guidelines which are applicable to your particular office records.

d. If the phraseology is not something that you would use, or something that your Office Director would sign, feel free to rewrite, but if you change the substance, please consult with us first.

e. The guidelines should be discussed with knowledgeable personnel in each of the offices. Approved For Release 2005/08/16 : CIA-RDP93B01104R000900040002-7 Let's try to make them as complete as possible.

f. When you are prepared, please call me and we can arrange to get together on an individual basis to review the guidelines if you wish before final typing.

8. Bear in mind that unlike the review conducted for FOIA or Privacy Act purposes, where documents are sanitized, under the declassification program the documents will be treated as a whole. If any part of the document requires continued classification then the entire document will remain classified. There will be no sanitization.

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10. Your help is needed. No one individual, or even a small group of individuals, can possibly possess all of the expertise and experience required to deal with the tremendous range of topics and activities in which this Agency is involved.

11. We have not yet been able to obtain from other agencies a useable guideline on how to handle information originated by them. This accounts for the several statements that we will act in accordance with guidance provided by others. When such guidance is received a change may be made.

12. Let's go down the list. I have comments on some items. Ask questions if you wish on any of them.

b. Expand this item where you are aware on such materials.

e. Ditto the above.

h. This has been coordinated with [] of the Office of the DDI.

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l and m. The time frames for re-review given here are suggested periods. If you differ, sound off.

r and s. I would particularly appreciate an expansion of the comment under these two.

v. Is this necessary? Again, your help will be appreciated.

13. We do not feel that anything in the guidelines requires that they be classified. Again, your help is needed. If anyone thinks classification is required, please give me a call.

14. This then, is your target, or at least something to build upon. I hope that this will make your task easier. We would appreciate and indeed it is necessary that you tell us if something of importance has been omitted. Unless you do so, the job will not be done as well as it should be done, more materials may be referred to your particular office for decision, and all of us may be somewhat unhappy.

15. Can we have these back within two weeks? The program is beginning to gain momentum and the first DDI reviewer will come on board in September. This does not leave too much time for a meeting of the minds where there may be differences, for the final writing, and then obtaining the approval of the Office Director.

16. In all probability, the new EO will require each agency to publish its guidelines in the Federal Register. Because of this we need an authoritative statement and authorizing review of his records as outlined in the guidelines.

17. One omission that came to light after this was typed is that of the Headquarters Regulations now charged to ISAS. Add this item to the guidelines, for each office must decide what part of the Regs may or may not be declassified.

18. If you are holding records that actually should be reviewed against guidelines prepared by another component, please bring them to our attention. One that readily comes to mind are the DDO information reports now charged to OCR.

19. Any questions?



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MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Information Systems and Analysis Staff, DDA NT

FROM : _____
Director, Office of _____

SUBJECT : Guidelines for 30-Year Declassification Review of
Office of _____
Documents and Materials.

1. The following guidelines were prepared in accordance with the requirements of Executive Order 11652 and the National Security Council implementation directive of 1 June 1972. The guidelines are to be applied to all documents, information, and materials originated by or attributable to the Office of _____ and/or functional predecessors over which it still maintains original or final authority.

a. Foreign Government or international organization materials

Classified documents and information furnished by a foreign government or international organization through any channel is excluded from automatic declassification.

b. Materials with statutory protection

Classified information or materials specifically covered by statute will be protected in accordance with the provisions of the relevant statute.

c. Cryptography

All information or material pertaining to cryptography generally requires continued protection. As the executive agent for communications

security for the Federal Government, NSA is the controlling authority.

d. Intelligence sources and methods

Information or material identifying sources and methods of intelligence is exempted from declassification. A source is a person, organization, or technical means which provides intelligence, subject to protection of identity and the intelligence relationship, and is vulnerable to counter action and thus could be lost or diminished in effectiveness should the source's identity become compromised.

Methods are the means by which support is provided to, or intelligence is received from sources, when such means are vulnerable to counter action or to loss of essential privacy if they are compromised.

When in doubt reviewers should refer questionable items to the DDO or the DDS&T as appropriate.

e. Systems, plans, installations, projects, or specific foreign relations matter

Classified information or material under this category requires continued protection if it is essential to the national security.

f. Personal jeopardy

Information or material must be protected if its disclosure would place a person in immediate jeopardy. This is not to be construed as political or social embarrassment, but as physical or severe political jeopardy.

g. Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data

Such material shall be downgraded and declassified in conformity with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the regulations of the ERDA.

h. "T" or "T-KH" materials

"T" or "T-KH" information or material should not appear in the

records prior to 1956. However, when it does appear, such materials should be segregated and referred to the Senior Intelligence Officer (the DDI) for determination of action to be taken.

i. SIGINT

Information, documents, or material pertaining to all forms of SIGINT will be reviewed for declassification in accordance with guidelines prepared by the NSA, executive agent for communications intelligence for the Federal Government, and/or the appropriate Agency component.

j. Department of State information

Documents and information originated by the Department of State will be declassified in accordance with guidelines provided by that agency.

k. Department of Defense and subordinate components

Documents and information originated by the Department of Defense or/and any of its components will be declassified in accordance with guidelines provided by them.

l. Contractual arrangements

Information pertaining to sensitive contractual arrangements with private individuals, commercial concerns and non-governmental institutions is exempted from declassification but should be reviewed again within 30 years following discontinuation of the relationship.

m. Relations with other Federal agencies

Information or material pertaining to sensitive relationships and agreements with other Federal agencies, including support to or from them, is exempted from declassification but should be reviewed again 30 years following discontinuation of the relationship.

n. Activity abroad

The fact that CIA functions in foreign areas is not sensitive, but the details of location, cover, staffing, and duties and activity

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are protected.

o. Cover

Information which reveals the non-official cover (NOC) of personnel employed by the CIA and its predecessors or the nature of the NOC arrangements is protected.

Information revealing arrangements for the placing and supporting of personnel of the CIA and its predecessors under official cover is protected.

p. Names and official titles

Names and official titles of personnel are generally protected below the level of Office Director, with selective exceptions based on prior disclosure.

q. Numbers of employees, size and composition of budgets

Such information is protected, along with any other quantitative factor indicating the scope or thrust of the intelligence effort during the period under review.

r. Estimative material

Estimative material published prior to the formation of the Office of National Estimates on 13 November 1950 is releasable unless it falls into an exemption category.

s. Situation and analytical reporting

Such reporting is releasable if sensitive sourcing is not stated or otherwise identified and if the information does not fall within another exemption category.

t. Organizational structure

The organizational structure of the CIA at headquarters level during the 1946-50 period can be declassified except for component breakdowns of those predecessor elements of the DDO.

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u. Pseudonyms, cryptonyms, codewords

The presence of pseudonyms, cryptonyms, and codewords in documents exempts them from declassification.

v. Controlled American Source (CAS)

The term Controlled American Source does not require protection but CAS information is exempt if it reveals material otherwise exempt, i.e., locations of stations, cover arrangements, or the relationship of a person or organization with U.S. or foreign intelligence agencies.

2. All documents certified as requiring continued protection after 30 years may be retained at the Confidential level. Decisions on the year in which the downgraded documents will again be reviewed for declassification will be made by the reviewer within the following limits: 50 years for COI, OSS, or SSU; 60 years for CIG; and 75 years for CIA. All periods are to begin with the date of origin of the classified documents.

Present at 29 Jul 001 FPO Meeting

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OER ✓

OIA ✓

DDI/CS ✓

ODDI ✓

DGCR ✓

PPG ✓

ORPA ✓

29 July 1977

Guideline Materials Sent to DDI Office FPOs who Failed to Attend 29 July Meeting: Four Office Focal Point Officers failed to attend the meeting held this date. The following materials were mailed to each of them:

Attached are the guidelines distributed at the meeting of the DDI Focal Point Officers this morning. The following are some of the comments made during the meeting. If you have any questions, please call me on

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1. The attached guidelines were compiled from EO 11652, the NSC implementing directive of 1 June 1972, and those guidelines of other offices already submitted and approved, plus a few not seen elsewhere. All of the guidelines may not be pertinent to all offices of the DDI. Indeed, some may not even be pertinent to the DDI, although this is unlikely.

2. Bear in mind that the guidelines will probably never be set in concrete. They should be viewed as living documents, subject to revision at any time as dictated by experience with records declassification, the particular time frame in which the reviewers are functioning, or even as the political realities of the day may dictate. They may also be amended when the new EO, now being written, is issued. Probably the greatest change that will result from the new EO is that the mandatory record review period may be changed from 30 to 20 years. I leave to your imagination the impact this will have on what is now a monumental task.

3. We are trying this particular format, rather than burying several topics in a narrative style paragraph, in the hope that it will be more useable to the reviewers. You are requested to review the attached and do the following:

a. Recommend deletions where you deem something not pertinent to your office's records or activities.

b. Recommend additions that you deem necessary.

c. Add guidelines which are applicable to your particular office records.

d. If the phraseology is something that you would not use, or something that your Office Director would not sign, feel free to rewrite but, if you change the substance, please consult with us first.

e. The guidelines should be discussed with knowledgeable personnel in each of the divisions of your office before they are finalized.

4. Bear in mind that unlike the review conducted for FOIA or Privacy Act purposes, where documents are sanitized, under the declassification program the documents will be treated as a whole. If any part of the document requires continued classification then the entire document will remain classified. There will be no sanitization.

STAT



6. Your help is needed. No one individual, or even a small group of individuals, can possibly possess all of the experience and expertise required to deal with the variety of topics and activities in which this Agency is involved. We have not yet been able to obtain from other agencies a useable guideline on how to handle information originated by them. This accounts for the several statements that we will act in accordance with guidance provided by others. When such guidance is received a change may be made.

7. Let me say this on the following specific items:

b. Expand this item where you are aware of such materials.

e. Ditto the above.

h. This has been coordinated with of the Office of the DDI.

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i. This includes all forms of signal intelligence and more than NSA will be involved in providing guidelines. It is proving difficult to obtain a definitive statement at this time.

l and m. The time frames for re-review given here are suggested periods. If you differ, sound off.

r and s. I would particularly appreciate an expansion of the comment under these two items.

v. Is this necessary? Again, your help will be appreciated.

8. We do not feel that anything in the guidelines requires that they be classified. Again, your help is needed. If you think that classification is required please give me a call.

9. The attached is your target, or at least something to build upon. I hope that this will make your task easier. We would appreciate and indeed it is necessary that you tell us if something of importance has been omitted. Unless you do so the job will not be done as well as it should be done, more materials may be referred to your particular office for decision, and all of us may be somewhat unhappy. The greater the effort now the less that will be required of you in the future.

10. Request that you return your guidelines to me by 15 August, with whatever changes, additions, etc., you deem necessary. The declassification program is beginning to gain momentum and the first DDI reviewer will come on board in September. This does not leave too much time for a meeting of the minds where there are differences, for the final writing, and then obtaining approval. In all probability the new EO will require each agency to publish its guidelines in the Federal Register, although we do not yet know what form will be required. Because of this and other reasons we will need the approval of Office Directors or the DDI authorizing review of the records as outlined in the guidelines. A single guideline for all of the DDI will be considered, with a major consideration being its length and whether it will be a useable tool for the reviewer.

11. One omission that came to light after this was typed is that of the Headquarters Regulations now charged to ISAS. Consider adding this item to the guidelines because it is likely that each office must decide what part of its Regulations may or may not be declassified. If you are holding records that actually should be reviewed against guidelines prepared by another component, please bring them to our attention. One group that readily comes to mind are the DDO information reports now charged to OCR.



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Documents and information originated by the Department of Defense or/and any of its components will be declassified in accordance with guidelines provided by them.

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Information pertaining to sensitive contractual arrangements with private individuals, commercial concerns and non-governmental institutions is exempted from declassification but should be reviewed again within 30 years following discontinuation of the relationship.

m. Relations with other Federal agencies

Information or material pertaining to sensitive relationships and agreements with other Federal agencies, including support to or from them, is exempted from declassification but should be reviewed again 30 years following discontinuation of the relationship.

n. Activity abroad

The fact that CIA functions in foreign areas is not sensitive, but the details of location, cover, staffing, and duties and activity

are protected.

o. Cover

Information which reveals the non-official cover (NOC) of personnel employed by the CIA and its predecessors or the nature of the NOC arrangements is protected.

Information revealing arrangements for the placing and supporting of personnel of the CIA and its predecessors under official cover is protected.

p. Names and official titles

Names and official titles of personnel are generally protected below the level of Office Director, with selective exceptions based on prior disclosure.

q. Numbers of employees, size and composition of budgets

Such information is protected, along with any other quantitative factor indicating the scope or thrust of the intelligence effort during the period under review.

r. Estimative material

Estimative material published prior to the formation of the Office of National Estimates on 13 November 1950 is releasable unless it falls into an exemption category.

s. Situation and analytical reporting

Such reporting is releasable if sensitive sourcing is not stated or otherwise identified and if the information does not fall within another exemption category.

t. Organizational structure

The organizational structure of the CIA at headquarters level during the 1946-50 period can be declassified except for component breakdowns of those predecessor elements of the DDO.

u. Pseudonyms, cryptonyms, codewords

The presence of pseudonyms, cryptonyms, and codewords in documents exempts them from declassification.

v. Controlled American Source (CAS)

The term Controlled American Source does not require protection but CAS information is exempt if it reveals material otherwise exempt, i.e., locations of stations, cover arrangements, or the relationship of a person or organization with U.S. or foreign intelligence agencies.

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~~Approved~~
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OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS		DATE	INITIALS
1				
2				
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	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY	
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH	PREPARE REPLY
	COMMENT		FILE	RECOMMENDATION
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	RETURN
				SIGNATURE

Remarks:

Attached sent to those who missed
29 July meeting:

1D0401, Hdqs.

7F33, Hdqs.

3F30, Hdqs.

7G25, Hdqs.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE _____

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PART II - SPECIFIC

The following guidelines are offered in addition to those in Part I and seek to relate more closely those general guidelines to particular record series to be reviewed for declassification.

Directives: DDI originated CIA and Offices issuances may be declassified unless annotated to the contrary.

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-CIA Issuances []
Regulations: Only these series include DDI-originated material and may be declassified:
[] Organization
Operations General
Intelligence Activities
Liaison

Notices and Handbooks:

Include ~~xxx~~ the above series plus [] which contain announcements of assignment to key positions at Office Director and above level and may be declassified.

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-Directorate and Office Issuances
These may contain series in addition to those noted above. Any issuances containing reference to an [] will be reviewed to conform with declassification action taken on the reference. Organizational or personnel announcements below the Office level will not be declassified.

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Reports

-Intelligence:

--In general, declassify unless report falls within one of the exemption categories in Part I, i.e. identifies sensitive sources and methods, contains cryptographic, SIGINT or T or TKH material. In addition, consideration should be given to control markings (e.g. NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION). These in themselves are not a barrier to

declassification. They are, however, a flag which indicates the information must be examined very carefully to determine that its release will not affect adversely present on-going relations with foreign governments or affect the conduct of subject country's current foreign policy vis-a-vis a third power.

--Review all intelligence reports in conjunction with related Production Case Files and/or Source copies, where they exist. These furnish source information and will be the best guide on declassification as they identify collectors, ~~who have declassification responsibility.~~

--Reports based on information collected by DDO or other CIA components or other federal agencies will be declassified in accordance with guidelines furnished by the collectors.

--Reports based on information received from foreign sources, release of which would affect adversely present and on-going US relations with foreign governments will not be declassified.

--National Estimates contributions. Action on these will be determined by action taken on the related finished estimates. NIO is guidance Office on these.

--Scientific intelligence reports may be declassified except those containing information on operational plans for the offensive employment of chemical, biological and/or radiological warfare which have not been released previously and which, if released, would affect adversely U.S. foreign policy. ~~However,~~ Any such information which has been extensively and accurately reported in the press or in other open source publications may be declassified (e.g., the behavioral studies, ~~remembering to clear with DDO if based on their reports or projects.~~)

--Weapons reports may be declassified except those containing technical information on weapons systems and equipment that

(1) may relate to a parallel system and equipment currently being withheld under DOD declassification guidelines.

(2) reveals the capabilities, limitations or vulnerabilities of such systems or equipment and which could be exploited

to counter, render ineffective, neutralize or destroy them.

- Reports or contributions prepared in response to National Security Council request or directive and related a U.S. Foreign Policy Paper: Declassification action should conform with action taken on the U.S. Foreign Policy Paper. NSC has guidelines responsibility.
- Biographic information may be declassified except if the information is of a nature that would be highly embarrassing or compromising to a friendly or collaborating foreign nationals and the release of which would be likely to impair US relations with the nation involved. Documents containing such material should not be declassified until 60 years after the publication date.
- Statistical data, costing or other purely factual reporting with little or no attempt at predictive analysis may be declassified.
- Information on conditions prevailing at a particular point in time and thus highly perishable may be declassified, e.g., enemy order of battle.
- Reports originated by private or public concerns doing business with the DDI will be declassified in conformance with the same guidelines used to declassify DDI-originated material unless all segments are exempt under contractual guidelines referred to in Part I.
- Management: Reports containing management type information may be declassified unless they contain personnel strength, resources or budget material.

Correspondence

- Executive direction and management. Information on the organization of the DDI, the chain of command, procedural policies, the planning and coordination of intelligence analysis and production activities, component missions and functions and working relationships generally may be declassified. Personnel

strength, resources and budget information may not be declassified.

- Production. Correspondence on particular reports are to be declassified according to the action taken on the related report. Correspondence on the general subject of production and production procedures and problems may be declassified.
- Foreign liaison. Correspondence to and from foreign governments and on ~~en~~ the general subject of liaison with foreign governments release of which would affect adversely U.S. foreign policy may not be declassified.
- DDI Activities Overseas. Correspondence revealing the presence and activity abroad by the DDI is not sensitive and may be declassified. Details of location, organization, cover, staffing and specifics of activity abroad may not be declassified.

STAT

Drafted by ODDI

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM	
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Remarks:

Mark - Attached is a rough draft containing suggested guidelines for declassification review process. My thought is that your paper be considered as Part I - General, and expanded a little - particularly under contractual arrangements, and that the attached be Part II. This is quick and messy draft but if I played with it any longer you (maybe)

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
DDI/RMU	8 Aug

might not get it. If you like the
idea, feel free to add to, delete,
refine, whatever. If you don't
like the idea, I found it an
interesting exercise and no
harm done.

STAT

